Monday, November 20, 2006

An even swap

If you were focused on the rate gyrations from last week, you might have missed what was actually the most important move in investment grade fixed income. Swap spreads. For our more casual readers, swap spreads represent the difference between the Treasury rate and the rate on the fixed portion of an interest rate swap. So for example, if one wanted to enter into a 10-year interest rate swap today, where you would be paying a fixed rate over the 10-years and receive 3-month LIBOR, the fixed rate would currently be 5.10%. That is currently 50bps over the 10-year. So we would say the 10-year swap spread is 50bps. Swaps are available for pretty much any term you like. Swap spreads tend to be about the same as very strong corporate spreads. On the short end, the corporate spread might be a little tighter and on the long end the swap spread is a little tighter.

This is extremely important for determining spreads of other products, in large part because swaps are a common means of hedging a fixed rate position. So if you are a corporate trader looking to take on credit risk, but want to eliminate interest rate risk, you would use a swap to do it. And if the swap spread rises, then your desire to own the hedged credit position diminishes, causing credit spreads to widen. MBS and Agency debt is also highly swap correlated.

The 10-year swap spread moved 4.5bps tighter in the last week, which might not sound like much, but is actually quite a move. 4.5 bps is about 3/8 of a point on the 10-year. The graph below shows it a little more dramatically.



The swap rate (green) moves down suddenly right at the end. There are a couple broad reasons why swap spreads tend to move. One is the slope of the curve, because a steeper slope allows for more carry trades, which increases the demand for rate hedges. But as the second graph shows, the curve has moved a good bit flatter (more inverted) during this period.



In fact, look back to June, when swap spreads were their widest. The slope has moved consistently flatter/more inverted, but swap spreads keep tightening. So that does not explain it.

Sometimes when the Treasury market sees a big rally, the swaps market lags. From 11/10 to 11/17, the 10-year was 1bps higher in yield. So that isn't it either.

Volatility can move swap spreads, with lower vol implying tighter spreads, but vol isn't moving. The implied vol on 5x5 swaptions was virtually unchanged last week. Vol has climbed from 15.3 in June to 16.8 now. All that time, swap spreads have gotten tighter.

To me, there is only one good explanation. Cash. Cash coming from the sidelines into the market and not enough supply to take it. Think about it: we know that MBS issuance is way down this year due to housing activity and higher rates. We also know that corporate issuance has been lackluster for a couple years. Even Agency issuance has been down due to delevering on the GSE's part. Meanwhile everyone from PM's to CDO managers to foreigners have to put cash someplace.

Tuesday, November 14, 2006

On Vacation

I'm on Vacation this week, so I probably won't have much intelligent to say about the markets here. See you next week.

Friday, November 10, 2006

Inflation target dead?

I recently read a Merrill Lynch commentary that mentioned, somewhat off-handedly, that an officially sanctioned inflation target for the Fed is less likely with a Democratic congress. As I've said many times, I'm a big fan of inflation targeting for a variety of reasons. I think most people who are of the Milton Friedman school of monetarism are at least sympathetic to the idea.

Inflation targeting works for various reasons, but one of the primary reasons is wrapped up in rational expectations theory. That is, when people expect a certain level of inflation, they will act accordingly. For example, when negotiating wage contracts, or borrowing rates, the expected inflation level will influence the final figures. These actions will steer inflation toward the expected level.

If you believe in rational expectations, then expanding the money supply can't have any impact on real GDP growth. If the public knows the Fed is providing easy money, they will adjust their inflation expectations. So laborers get raises but firms raise prices all at the same rate, so no one is better off and inflation is higher.

Keynesians reject the notion that economic actors are all that rational. So let's say there is a glut of inventories in the economy at the time the Fed is expanding the money supply. Now consumers have more money but maybe firms don't raise prices right away and instead choose to reduce inventory. Had the influx of money-related demand not occurred, firms may have cut production in order to eliminate inventory, which reduces GDP. But because of the money expansion, the inventory is sold and production levels remain high.

I'm sure most people reading this are thinking both scenarios sound pretty reasonable. I'm more sympathetic to the monetarist perspective. In the second scenario, I agree you'd wind up with inventory reduction, but before too long the easy money would result in pure inflation, and that increased level of inflation would become ingrained in expectations. Now to bring inflation expectations back down, the Fed would need to conduct a painful round of tightening. So the short-term benefit of better GDP through easy money is more than offset by the need for severe tightening down the road.

But my opinion isn't the one that matters. If the people in congress, and the people advising them (like Paul Krugman) think more along the Keynesian line, then they will more often advocate monetary policy based on various economic figures, like capacity utilization and business inventories, not just core PCE. Ben Bernanke would then be in a political fight to get his inflation target, which not only would jeopardize his job should the Democrats take the White House, but could even impact the Fed's independence.

Bernanke can run a de facto inflation targeting Fed anyway. He makes a public announcement that he wants core PCE to be between 1.5% and 2.5%, and promises to do everything in his power to keep it there. Pretty much an inflation target eh? Why risk the political fight?

Thursday, November 09, 2006

Another non-bond post

In thinking about the Democratic sweep on Tuesday, I continue to struggle with what they are actually going to do with their new-found power. The consensus is they'll try to increase the minimum wage, but I think most serious economists will agree that this will have minimal impact on the economy as a whole. Its also widely reported that the Dems are interested in curbing executive pay.

This gets me thinking about the issue of income disparity. The fairness element of this issue is a debate for another forum. My question is, what are the economic consequences of a widening income disparity?

First, it seems there is no single measure for income disparity. What is the correct way to measure this? Is it the top 10% vs. the bottom 10% in income? Or 1%, or 20%? Is the relevant question how do the richest Americans compare with the poorest, or how the poorest compare with the median, or how the median compare with the richest? Sometimes the "poverty line" is used in calculating income disparity, but this tends to be a moving target.

In my mind, we cannot define how to measure the issue without defining what economic problems might arise. The classic argument is that too much income disparity leads to social unrest. So let's think about that for a moment. If the gap between the wealthiest 10% and the poorest 10% is widening because the rich are getting richer but the poor are about the same, then there is no reason to expect social unrest.

History tells us that social unrest tends to grow out of hopelessness more so that simple disparity. The French and Russian peasants lived with the feudal system for centuries and rose up not because they suddenly resented the rich, but because they were starving. I'm sure they resented their feudal lords all along, but it was only once their situation got worse that actual social unrest occurred.

Now, it sounds like I'm being incredibly callous about poverty in America. This argument is not to say that there aren't people really struggling nor that there is nothing we should do about poverty as a society. Again, fairness is another issue for another blog. What I'm saying is that the issue of income disparity, as it exists in America, is not a macroeconomic growth problem. It is a political issue. A moral issue.

So as January rolls around and the Democrats start making the case for a higher minimum wage and for curbs on executive pay, there will undoubtedly be arguments that there are economic problems with large income disparity. Whatever your position is on these issues from a fairness/moral perspective, income disparity as an economic problem is dubious.

No signals today

Mixed bag of economic data today. Import prices were low, inventories high, and consumer confidence low. That bolsters the bond bull's position. But jobless claims and the trade deficit were both low, which bolsters the bond bear's position. None of these are numbers I'm all that interested in. We really have to wait until Tuesday of next week to get anything real meaningful with PPI and retail sales. I'm focused on generalized inflation figures and consumer spending, and to a lesser extent, housing inventories.

Wednesday, November 08, 2006

Don't blame the Dems

The bond market has been grinding higher the last 3 sessions after last Friday's blood bath. Today I keep seeing headlines saying Treasuries are advancing on the Democratic sweep of the legislative branch. I don't think so. I think you had fast money move the market lower on Friday, but so-called real money accounts pushing it higher the last three days.

I'm basing this on three things. First, I'm hearing from a lot of small dealers that anything in inventory not nailed down is getting lifted. If someone like Morgan Keegan or First Tennessee is seeing their 500 bond Freddie Mac positions lifted left and right, that's banks and smaller money managers, not big hedge funds.

Second, spreads are moving tighter in MBS and corporates. If hedge funds were pushing the market around, they'd be doing it in derivatives, which would leave spreads at best unchanged. Probably wider.

Finally, hedge funds and prop traders (i.e., fast money) like to trade the number. In other words, they are the ones who tend to move the market whenever big economic releases cause a large move, like last Friday. Real money tends to form a generalized economic opinion that doesn't change from day to day, regardless of that day's economic number. So when you I see several days of small moves all in the same direction, its indicative of long-term buyers entering the market.

So what's that telling you? There are two possibilities. Either more money managers are becoming convinced by the bearish economic forecasts, or its simple portfolio squaring. I think the later. The most recent piece of major economic data was positive, so I don't think PM's were convinced of the bearish thesis by anything that's happened in the last two weeks. However, regardless of my position, I'm always looking to square my portfolios. By that I mean, get cash that's accrued to work. If a PM is already bullish on rates, he wouldn't wait around much with cash, jumping in with bids anytime there is a sell-off.

To me that sounds a lot like the last three days.

Crowding out effect

Every other blog in the world is spending today pontificating about the change in control of the U.S. House (and probably the Senate). Talking about how it will impact the markets beyond the next week or so is speculative at best. I say this because the Democrats ran primarily on a anti-Iraq/Bush platform, not really on any sort of economic policy. At one time, the Democrats were the tax and spend party, promoting transfer programs and heavy regulation. But the last really successful Democratic politician, Bill Clinton, spent his years lowering the deficit, reforming welfare, and getting NAFTA past. So A) I think the focus will remain on Iraq, possibly creating neglect on other issues, and B) We don't know what direction the Democrats are going to head since they never told us.

On this blog, however, we talk about the bond market. Since the budget deficit was an issue that caused at least some typical Republican voters to switch sides in 2006, I thought today's entry could focus on the so-called crowding-out effect.

The crowding-out effect is when government borrowing causes higher interest rates, increasing the cost of private investment activity. With the increased cost, some amount of private investment is forgone, hence deficit spending by the government results in "crowding-out" of private activity. Some argue that deficit spending is therefore economically harmful. They either argue that government spending is inherently inferior to private spending, or that any stimulus from the deficit spending would be offset by the crowding out effect.

We know that, all else being equal, if the government borrows more, interest rates will rise. Its simple supply and demand, the government demands more money (or supplies more bonds) and therefore the price of money (interest rates) must rise. So it would seem as though the crowding out effect is pretty obvious.

However, academics looking for an actual impact on the economy from the crowding out effect struggle to find one. I think this is for a couple reasons. One is, many factors influence interest rates, so trying to isolate just one is very tough. Second, the government has changed their borrowing strategy at various times in history, so at one period they may borrow more long-term and another more short-term, which would have different impacts on interest rates.

I think the biggest reason why the crowding out effect is hard to observe is that the national debt as a percentage of GDP isn't that volatile. Here is a graph of same.



The figure increased a bit during the 1991 recession/Gulf War, decreased during the capital gains tax boom of 1999-2000, and increased again during the Iraqi War. But overall, not that volatile. In addition, government spending does encourage some degree of private investment, e.g., the government awards a defense contract to Boeing, so Boeing expands its production capacity. So combine the relative stability of Federal debt, and the mitigating impact of encouraging some degree of private investment, and it turns out the crowding-out effect doesn't have much effect on interest rates in any given year. I'd say more likely that the crowding out effect has a fair-sized impact, its just fairly constant from year-to-year.

That being said, I think there is merit to the idea that private investment is better for the long-term prospects of the economy than government spending. The reason why savings/investment is important for an economy is to replenish our capital stock (i.e., keep factories in working order), and to expand productive capacity (i.e., build more factories). If we have no investment, then our ability to produce more goods to keep up with population growth is hampered. That would cause per-capita income to decline.

Some government spending programs are for infrastructure, which are important long-term investments. But much of government spending has no positive long-term impact on productive capacity of the economy. For example, when the government buys more tanks, the goal is to defend our borders not to expand productive capacity. Defense is an attempt to maintain the status-quo, and while obviously important, the economy would be better off in the long-run if we didn't have to spend as much. We spend on defense because we have to, not because we want to. Similarly, transfer payments (e.g., social security, medicare), don't expand our productive capacity at all. Mind you, this isn't a political judgment about the merits of transfer payments, rather a statement of fact about the nature of these payments.

So generally its up to private investors to build new factories, invent new products, etc. Its clear that federal deficit spending has some impact on interest rates and therefore crowds out some level of private investment. Plus, you ultimately cannot keep spending more than you're bringing in, the compounding of interest will eat you alive. So on the balance I'm for lowering the deficit. But the deficit problem does get way too much play as an economic issue among both politicians and the media.

Monday, November 06, 2006

Housing and golf

I was playing golf with a client about 2 years ago, and as I was lining up a putt, I declared that it was impossible for the housing market to get so expensive that people couldn't afford houses. Home prices are governed by supply and demand like any other market, I reasoned. If the price is too high, demand would fall. Since demand (at the time) was in fact, rising, obviously prices aren't so high that homes were generally unaffordable. Obviously it could become unaffordable for a given consumer, but not for consumers generally.

What I ignored was the possibility of widespread investment in residential real estate. According to the National Association of Realtors, 27.7% of homes bought in 2005 were for investment. Investors have to outbid consumers for properties. It may be that a portion of homes bought by investors wouldn't have sold to a consumer, e.g., a home in such bad condition that its unlivable. In the majority of cases, though, investor demand has shifted the demand curve for homes outward.

So far, housing starts have fallen about 500,000 from their peak in January. Investor demand in 2005 represented about 2.3 million homes, so the lost demand from investors out-weighs the decrease in new supply.

As FRB of Dallas president Richard Fisher said the other day, the Fed really created this housing bubble by holding rates so low for so long. I am increasingly of the belief that investors speculating in the housing market really created the bubble.

Investors will not hold on to houses at a loss. They will either rent them out or sell them at a loss and walk away. The good news for the housing market is that if economic fundamentals continue to be strong, then it should only take 1-2 years to wring out the speculative investors. After that, I'd think the housing market will get back to a more normal pace of appreciation.

Friday, November 03, 2006

Bam!

On the back of yesterday’s fairly high ULC figure, today’s low unemployment figure has the Treasury market running for cover. The 10-year is down a full point and the 30-year is down 1 and a half.

I can see why this is causing consternation for the bond bulls. With inflation figures still high and unemployment falling, what's the argument for Fed cuts again?

Not that simple

Commenter Richard suggested that my "simple math" from yesterday really isn't that simple. He's right for a variety of reasons. Most obvious is that the ULC calculation might not perfectly reflect total consumer income, such as wealth gains from sale of securities or real estate. Another important point which Richard brought up is the problem of imports. If consumers have 5% more income but use it entirely to buy foreign goods, the impact on U.S. inflation may be minimal.

I spoke with John Burger of Loyola College in Maryland's economics department last night about ULC. He supposed the negative serial correlation issue I mentioned yesterday is probably due to poor measurement on the part of the BLS. Be that flawed methodology or that the data is just hard to get a handle on, either way I'm suspicious of the downward trend in ULC.

Thursday, November 02, 2006

Fisher on the tape

FRB of Dallas president Richard Fisher spoke in New York today, speaking mostly about data quality and the need to look at activity beyond U.S. borders when making decisions about domestic monetary policy.

This speech sounds a little less hawkish than other's he's given recently. His (and my) favorite inflation gauge -- trimmed mean PCE -- printed a little lower last month, falling to 1.7% from 2.7% the previous month. The YoY number is still 2.6%, which everyone would agree is too high. Anyway, Fisher characterized the inflation picture thusly:

"It is possible that the trend in overall consumer inflation has peaked and is finally heading lower. Next, the not-so-good news: The overall inflation trend remains at a level above my comfort zone. I am encouraged by the change in direction of trend inflation, and I hope that in the future my CEO and CFO contacts will be telling me that the competitive forces of globalization have kept their pricing power limited or nonexistent."

I have to read that as Fisher would start to feel more amiable to cuts if trimmed PCE continued to print below 2%, particularly if the YoY number would fall to that level.

A labor of love... and money

Unit Labor Costs, one of the stats I view as critical in the analysis of inflation, came in higher than expected this morning: +3.8% vs. survey of 3.4%. Productivity was also below expectations: 0.0% vs. 1.0% surveyed. ULC for 2Q was also revised higher from 4.9% to 5.4%.

The bond market is mildly lower: down about 1/8. I'm surprised its not down more. My suspicion is that the bond bulls are focusing on the trend for ULC more so than the number itself. Witness the graph! The green line is the stat and the yellow is a four quarter moving average.



So while the 3Q ULC rise is well above the 15-year average of 1.74%, it has also decelerated two quarters in a row. Visually, it doesn't look like this is a figure that goes through short-term trends. In other words, it seems to accelerate one quarter then decelerate the other. In fact, only 26% of periods did the change in ULC show the same sign two quarters in a row.

The moving average is more telling. Note that the ULC is calculated on a quarterly basis and then annualized, so a four quarter moving average gives us a good full-year picture. The MA shows more apparent trends. During the deflation scare of 2001-2002, we did indeed see weak ULC figures. Today, we are obviously on an upswing. In fact, the MA is currently 5.30%, matched in this time series only by 5.35% in 3Q 2000.

If the dollars paid to laborers are rising at a 5.3% clip, the marginal propensity to consume is about 100% (i.e. consumers spend every additional dollar they earn), and output of consumer goods is growing below 5.3%, then consumer prices must increase. Even a monetarist such as myself can agree to this more Keynesian approach, because its simple math.

If you hold goods available for sale constant, but increase the dollars consumers have to spend, then the price of those goods must rise. It follows that if you increase the dollars consumers have to spend at a faster pace than output increases, then prices must rise.

Monetarists believe that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon. But in real life, its tough to tell what the relevant money supply is. For example, if the Fed puts more money into circulation, but some foreign central bank decides to put an equal amount of dollars into a vault to maintain a currency peg, money available to the economy hasn't really changed at all. So we're forced to look at indicators of increasing money supply, such as rising labor costs.

In real life, my simple Keynesian math example gets a little complicated, because you have to consider availability of imports, which are fluid. But in my mind, as long as ULC is growing faster than 3% or so, core PCE will stay above the Fed's comfort zone. I can’t see the Fed cutting in this environment.

Wednesday, November 01, 2006

CME to list CDS

The Chicago Mercantile Exchange plans to list futures on credit defaults. It sounds to me as though the process will be similar to a credit-default swap, but will be exchange traded, which should improve liquidity.

A credit-default swap is where one party agrees to pay a fixed payment and in exchange, the other party agrees to buy a reference obligation at par in the event of a default. So let's say you owned some Clear Channel Communications bonds and you wanted to eliminate the credit risk, but for whatever reason, you didn't want to sell the bonds. You sell a credit default swap, and if Clear Channel defaults, you simply sell your bonds to the other party at par. You pay for the protection in the form of a fee, which in practice is similar to the LIBOR spread of a floating-rate bond of the same issuer.

CDS have come to dominate corporate bond trading, because its a cleaner way of achieving credit exposure. Rather than try to find a specific bond, which may or may not be available, you simply short the CDS, which pays you the spread you wanted anyway. CDS can also be more liquid than specific bond issues, which makes it a good place for hedge funds to speculate on movements in the credit market.

If the CME goes through with their program, it would make derivatives trading all the more attractive over cash corporates for large institutional investors. Will anyone actually trade bonds anymore??

Monday, October 30, 2006

Musings on income growth

It sure feels like there are two camps about where the economy is going, and incoming data is only causing parties in both camps to harden their positions.

Today we have personal income and personal spending. Personal income growth for September came in a fairly strong +0.5%. Incomes are up a healthy 6.8% YoY (3.9% in real terms), which is well above the 20-year average of 5.5% (or 2.8% in real terms). Those thinking the economy is still strong and inflation is a concern can point to strong income growth.

Consumer spending is a different story. It grew a meager 0.1% for September. Consumer spending has risen 5.5% over the last 12-months, below the 20-year average of 6%. Real consumer spending is up 3.4% YoY, which is right on the long-term average.

I look at this data and see at worst a modest slowdown. Consumers spend about a year paying down some of the debt they incurred during the housing boom, then its back to spending as usual. The savings rate right now is -0.2%. If we assume consumers "want" to have a savings rate around 1%, income is growing at 7% (nominal) per year, spending can grow at a 5.8% (nominal) rate over the next year, then resume growing at 7% thereafter. That'd be around 3% spending growth in real terms, only about 0.4% weaker than the long-term average. If we take the rule of thumb that 70% of the economy is consumer driven, that's about a 0.3% ding against real GDP.

I don't see the Fed cutting if this is how it plays out as I just described. But that description is a little overly simplistic. We know there are some housing-related challenges looming. The Calculated Risk blog argues that the impact from weak housing is yet to be felt, both because construction job losses will accelerate and because mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW) with continue to decline.

How far MEW falls depends entirely on how severe the housing correction turns out to be. To me, if income continues to climb, the glut of home inventories will work it self out without needing deep declines in home prices. So MEW settles in around +$200 billion, which is where it was in the late 1990's. That's a decline of around $300 billion from where it was in the 2nd quarter, or 2.2% of GDP. I'm using Federal Reserve figures here: estimates of MEW vary greatly. Anyway, the Fed thinks about half of MEW feeds into GDP, so a decline in MEW probably weighs on GDP to the tune of 1.1%.

Would the Fed cut in response to a 1.1% decline in GDP? Probably, but if they estimated that the impact was a one-off, its not going to be an aggressive campaign. In other words, if the impact of MEW is -1.1% in 2007 but its clear the housing market has stabilized, income and spending are growing, I can't see the Fed cutting more than 50bps or so. To do more would risk inflation at a time when the economy is on an upswing.

Credit where credit is due

Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and Bear Stearns all saw their credit rating upgraded by S&P on Friday. I've made no secret that I like brokerage bonds (here and here), and will disclose right now that my clients own various issues from all three of these firms.

Why the upgrade? All three companies are making money hand over fist despite the inverted yield curve that was supposed cause them so much trouble. In the last 5 years, the list of events that could have hurt the brokerage business are many:

  1. Bear market in stocks in 2000-2002.
  2. "Research" scandal.
  3. Post-bear market weakness in IPO market.
  4. Argentina default in 2001.
  5. Post-depression records set in corporate bond defaults in 2001 (source: S&P). 2002 was #2 and 2000 was #3.
  6. Deflation scare in 2003.
  7. REFCO collapse in 2005.
  8. Inverted yield curve in 2005-2006.

But the fact is, the big brokers continue to reap impressive profits. The ratings agencies are finally getting the clue that the brokerage business is more diversified than it was 20 years ago. That the increased leverage these firms are taking on is appropriate, given their ability to manage risk. Could something happen? Some sort of contagion event? Sure. But the same could be said for any company.

A lot is made about the world being more linked together today than in years past. An economic event in Asia or Latin America is no longer a local issue, but has worldwide implications. One thing that isn't talked much about, is the flip side of that statement. That because investors are involved in situations all over the world, that risk has become more spread out. For example, whereas once banks owned most of the risk in the consumer mortgage market, today that risk can be securitized or sold off in the form of CDS. So now, various investors will suffer a small amount if consumer mortgages go bad, rather than the pain being concentrated among a smaller number of financial intermediaries. Contagion risk is lower than most people think.

Friday, October 27, 2006

Some REAL bond trader shit...

On Wednesday I made an off-handed comment that I'd probably be moving to a more neutral position on MBS from an overweight. Steve Feiss made a nice comment on my MBS idea, so I thought I'd flesh out my philosophy on MBS.

Now, I warn you, I spend a lot of time talking about interest rates on this blog. That's something that most people involved in the investment business follow and enjoy reading. Today's post is some real bond trader shit, that probably Steve Feiss and 1-2 other readers will care about. I'm probably looking at the lowest number of hits in months. What the hell, its my blog.

Scott Simon, head of MBS trading at PIMCO, once said that investment managers could add or subtract more alpha in MBS than any other sector, including corporates. I'd say anecdotally that very few investment managers would agree with that. But I know I have added far more value in my career through MBS trading than other sectors. And it hasn't been through aggressive trading. In fact, I'd say that maybe 20% of the MBS positions I've taken over the years were sold before simply paying off.

MBS are extremely complicated on one hand. If you buy a 30-year pass-through with 100 loans in it, then you've really bought 100 30-year non-call 0 loans. That's bond lingo for saying that you really own 100 different loans with 30-years to maturity that can be called at any time (ergo, non-call for zero years). But unlike, say an agency bond structured as a 30-year non-call 0, each of the 100 borrowers may or may not prepay their mortgage for non-economic reasons. Plus a portion of the loan's principal is repaid each month, so while there is technically 30-years to maturity, even with no prepayments most of the principal in the MBS will be repaid well before 30-years.

Many investors attack MBS from an OAS framework. I am dead-set against this. OAS vastly over simplifies a mortgage holders decision making. I've never seen an OAS model that didn't either A) assume a mortgage holders prepayment decision was entirely economic, B) make a blanket assumption about the impact of various characteristics of the underlying loans, or C) assume that prepayments due to "life events," such as moving to another city, occur "normally." So the result is the foundation of the OAS model is built upon assumptions that everyone knows are invalid! By this I mean that A) we know the decision isn't entirely economic, B) we know that the impact of loan characteristics are not consistent from one economic cycle to the next, and C) home mobility is greatly impacted by economic cycles and home price appreciation, so its not likely to occur in a smooth pattern. On top of this shaky foundation of assumptions, OAS models layer on more assumptions about how prepayments will shift due to movements in rates. Again, prepayment models are full of assumptions that everyone knows are invalid.

But if we separate what we know about MBS from what we don't know, the sector becomes rather simple. We know what the coupon rate is on a MBS. We also know that in the course of time, rates are likely to fall such that the underlying loans have a refinancing opportunity. That assumption might be questionable for a small segment of MBS with extremely low coupons, but it holds for most. We also know that in the course of time, most people move out of their current residence.

So what can we do with what we know here? If we figure that eventually a given MBS will come into the money (i.e., refinancable), we can assume that a large percentage of the MBS holders will prepay their loan at that time. We don't know when this might happen or what percentage of the holders will prepay, but we can vary both those factors enough to see the range of likely returns for the security. All we do is assume a small percentage of the loan will prepay in each period up until the time that it becomes refinancable, at which point prepayments will spike.

We then compare that to alternatives, bearing in mind that if the MBS has moved in the money, that alternative bonds would also enjoy capital gains. Typically, the MBS position pays a lot more in yield than other options, but in a rally is likely to substantially underperform. If using this methodology, you find a particular coupon/term structure is way overvalued, you can bet that its a structure that happens to look good in a lot of OAS models, but would break down in a refi spike.

The real skill then becomes seeing if you can find particular MBS that are likely to prepay more favorably than a generic. For example, let's say that you buy a premium priced MBS, so one that would perform terribly in a near-term refi spike. You might be able to find a particular pool where the underlying loan rate is below average for that coupon. For example, a typical 6.5% coupon MBS would have an underlying loan rate of 7%. But its possible to find bonds with an underlying loan rate as low as 6.75%. While we don't know what interest rates are going to do, we know that at any interest rate level, the 6.75% bond will have a lower refi incentive than a typical bond with the same coupon. The funny thing about it is, you rarely if ever have to pay a premium for what is an obviously superior security.

A similar story exists for other loan characteristics, such as average credit score, loan size, geographic distribution, etc. Granted, its a little more difficult to assume how these factors will impact prepayments, but since you can usually buy MBS with these characteristics at the same price as generic bonds, you are in essence making a bet without putting any money in. It almost has to work in your favor over the long run.

For example, I recently added some 30-year 5.5% coupon bonds. These are trading in the $98 range, so what I want to avoid is these bonds paying slower than average. In this market, its widely believed that the "life event" prepayments will occur slower because home price appreciation is down. The logic is that if a borrower doesn't have the cash to put down on a new house because his current house hasn't appreciated, he won't be able to move.

So if I buy a discount MBS, I want to find bonds that won't have the home price appreciation problem. That would include older loans, because those borrowers have already enjoyed some home price appreciation, and loans where the borrower is on strong financial footing. You can tell by looking for high credit scores, larger loans, and a loan-to-value below 80%. (The opposite of loan-to-value is equity, so a LTV of 65% means the borrower has 35% equity). I have no problem finding 30-year 5.5% MBS which are 6-12 months old, and appear to be full of loans given to borrowers with strong finances. And I paid nothing over generic MBS. If it turns out that these bonds don't pay a cent faster than generic, no harm no foul. But if they do, that's adding alpha.

Thursday, October 26, 2006

Suck out

I'm not a big poker player, but I really enjoy the theories behind how the game is played. I think there are a lot of corollaries between a good trader and a good poker player. So let me make a poker analogy to the market action yesterday.

Yesterday I made the following statement: "...sentiment seems pretty bearish so a moderate sounding statement may bring a small rally." And that's exactly what happened. The statement sounded very much like the recent speeches we've seen from various Fed economists. Basically that inflation is too high right now, but a moderately cooling economy should allow the Fed to stay on hold for a while.

So why the rally if every one already knew this was the Fed's position? Because, in poker terms, the bond bears were all in. In poker, when players in front of you have made big bets, and the pot has gotten very large, sometimes the best strategy is to call the bet even if you think you have a less than 50% chance of winning the pot. For example, if the pot has $1,000 in it, and all you had to do was put $100 in to stay in the game, then as long as you have a better than 1/10 chance of winning, its a good bet.

That's what we had yesterday. The bond bears had bet heavily on a very hawkish Fed statement. Therefore, unless the statement was uber-hawkish, the market wasn't going to move much. On the other hand, since no one was betting on a moderate statement, that outcome resulted in a fair-sized rally.

Now, it isn't really my job to make short-term trades like that, so I can't say I made any money on my correct prognostication. But I think it reiterates the idea that you have to both analyze your economic opinion and what the market has priced in. Otherwise, you make lose money while being right all the way.

Wednesday, October 25, 2006

Lonely morning on trading floors

Not much to talk about in front of the Fed today. The market is very quiet waiting to see what the Fed statement will say. Probably not much, but sentiment seems pretty bearish so a moderate sounding statement may bring a small rally. Fed Funds futures now price in a ~15% chance of a hike in January, which is a sharp contrast to a few weeks ago when futures started to price in some chance of a cut at the same time. Still seems like the front end ought sell-off more than where it is. On longer bonds, I'm feeling very neutral. Over the next 12-18 months, I think the curve will develop a more normal slope. Like +25 to +50 between 2-30. But if the Fed indeed hikes one more time, but the market still expects cuts over the long-term, then the inversion will get deeper, at least for now, with the 2-year rising and the 10-30yr area standing still. Unless the Fed actually manufactures a deflationary environment, I think the upside (i.e. declining yields) to the long-end is limited to 25bps or so.

With limited upside, I can't see adding to the long-end of the curve here. I hate positioning my long-term portfolios for relatively small moves, because I'm taking a fair sized risk with my clients money for what I only expect to be a small reward. Also, whether I'm able to capture that small reward depends very greatly on my ability to time the move just right, which is always difficult. Plus, in this market, going out the curve might cost you income generation. Income is a known quantity, and its very hard to give up a known quantity for a possible reward that isn't that big to begin with.

One thing that is worth acting on is my MBS position. MBS will probably cheapen in a deeper inversion scenario, and that puts my MBS overweight at risk. Corporates most likely also get cheaper, but I'm already underweight there.

Monday, October 23, 2006

What does Greg Ip have against the Treasury market anyway?

Greg Ip of the Wall Street Journal, who is a long rumored Fed mouth piece, has a piece out today saying the Fed could go on hold much longer than in the 1995 period. Regular readers of this blog know I've been making that case for a while now. Ip does bring something fresh to the conversation: how Bernanke's affinity for inflation targeting may influence his actions in ways that didn't Greenspan in 1995.

Under Greenspan, no one knew exactly what the Fed's tolerance was for inflation. Marketeers and policy makers could broadly agree that core CPI at 4%, as it was when Greenspan took over, was too high. But as former president of the Atlanta Fed Robert Forrestal said (quoted by Ip): "We talk about price stability and lower inflation, and inflation being quiescent, and so on, but I don't know what our level of tolerance is." Dr. Greenspan believed in judgment over econometrics. He believed the economy and markets were driven by emotional human beings. Check out this quote from a recent interview with Sherry Cooper of Nesbitt Burns.

"Ayn Rand showed me that my views were self-contradictory. From her, I learned that the economy is driven by psychology, values, attitudes, trust and other often-irrational and immeasurable factors. Rand showed me that judgment is a key ingredient in all economic forecasting and analysis. One cannot understand society as a whole unless you deal with all of it. Economics is more than a technical field. It is based on the whole spectrum of human decision-making and action. Econometrics is only part of the game. A good example of this is that to complete economic transactions, people must trust the word of strangers. This works because it's practical. I would likely have been a reclusive econometrician, spitting out bad forecasts, if it weren't for Ayn Rand."

So if we follow Greenspan's idea of judgment over rigid rules, it stands to reason that he'd not want to give hard numbers on where he wanted inflation to be.

Bernanke is a man of evidence. The evidence points strongly to the value of inflation targeting. Read this panel discussion from the summer of 2004: it's a roadmap to how Bernanke is operating today. So while it might be politically sensitive for the Fed to create a statutory inflation target, de facto, we already have one. As soon as Fed economists publicly start throwing around ranges like 1.5% to 2.5%, for all intents and purposes, that's the inflation target.

For what its worth, I am a man of evidence as well. I've read the evidence for and against inflation targeting, and I find the evidence favors the target. But really, for someone in my profession, its besides the point as to whether the inflation target is good for the economy in the long run. The fact is, for the near term at least, the Fed is going to focus on keeping core PCE between 1.5% and 2.5%.

So to bet that the Fed is going to act like it did in 1995 is to assume that two very different philosophies about how to run the Fed will come to the same conclusion. If that happens, then it will be by coincidence. 1995, in my mind, should clearly not be used as evidence for what's going to happen in 2007.

What does Greg Ip have against the Treasury market anyway?

Greg Ip of the Wall Street Journal, who is a long rumored Fed mouth piece, has a piece out today saying the Fed could go on hold much longer than in the 1995 period. Regular readers of this blog know I've been making that case for a while now. Ip does bring something fresh to the conversation: how Bernanke's affinity for inflation targeting may influence his actions in ways that didn't Greenspan in 1995.

Under Greenspan, no one knew exactly what the Fed's tolerance was for inflation. Marketeers and policy makers could broadly agree that core CPI at 4%, as it was when Greenspan took over, was too high. But as former president of the Atlanta Fed Robert Forrestal said (quoted by Ip): "We talk about price stability and lower inflation, and inflation being quiescent, and so on, but I don't know what our level of tolerance is." Dr. Greenspan believed in judgment over econometrics. He believed the economy and markets were driven by emotional human beings. Check out this quote from a recent interview with Sherry Cooper of Nesbitt Burns.

"Ayn Rand showed me that my views were self-contradictory. From her, I learned that the economy is driven by psychology, values, attitudes, trust and other often-irrational and immeasurable factors. Rand showed me that judgment is a key ingredient in all economic forecasting and analysis. One cannot understand society as a whole unless you deal with all of it. Economics is more than a technical field. It is based on the whole spectrum of human decision-making and action. Econometrics is only part of the game. A good example of this is that to complete economic transactions, people must trust the word of strangers. This works because it's practical. I would likely have been a reclusive econometrician, spitting out bad forecasts, if it weren't for Ayn Rand."

So if we follow Greenspan's idea of judgment over rigid rules, it stands to reason that he'd not want to give hard numbers on where he wanted inflation to be.

Bernanke is a man of evidence. The evidence points strongly to the value of inflation targeting. Read this panel discussion from the summer of 2004: it's a roadmap to how Bernanke is operating today. So while it might be politically sensitive for the Fed to create a statutory inflation target, de facto, we already have one. As soon as Fed economists publicly start throwing around ranges like 1.5% to 2.5%, for all intents and purposes, that's the inflation target.

For what its worth, I am a man of evidence as well. I've read the evidence for and against inflation targeting, and I find the evidence favors the target. But really, for someone in my profession, its besides the point as to whether the inflation target is good for the economy in the long run. The fact is, for the near term at least, the Fed is going to focus on keeping core PCE between 1.5% and 2.5%.

So to bet that the Fed is going to act like it did in 1995 is to assume that two very different philosophies about how to run the Fed will come to the same conclusion. If that happens, then it will be by coincidence. 1995, in my mind, should clearly not be used as evidence for what's going to happen in 2007.