Sunday, March 30, 2008

The cautionary tale of Jefferson County Alabama

Jefferson County Alabama's sewer authority was once considered among the most sophisticated issuers in municipal finance. Now they are on the brink of Chapter 9. What happened, and can it happen to other municipal issuers?

It all started when investment bankers cooked up a clever way to use derivatives to lower interest expense for municipal issuers. The municipality would sell auction-rate debt, then enter into a pay fixed, receive floating interest rate swap. For tax-exempt issuers, the floating end of the swap is either based on a percentage of LIBOR or the SIFMA Index, which is an index of floating rate municipal debt rates.

The result of these transactions was a synthetic fixed-rate bond. The initial floating liability had been turned into a fixed liability via the derivative transaction. Bankers were able to show that through these machinations, even after hefty fees to the investment bank, the issuer would realize a interest rate savings.

For Jefferson County, those savings were important. They had been ordered by a federal court to make significant upgrades to their sewer system to comply with environmental standards. As a result, there has been a 3-fold increase in sewer rates over the last 10 years. In fact, the sewer system became highly leveraged in an attempt to spread out construction costs over time, which in turn would prevent the pain (and political embarrassment) of even larger rate increases.

Historically, auction rate municipal debt had consistently reset at or very near the SIFMA rate, which in turn was always highly correlated with LIBOR. But the recent liquidity crisis changed all that. Starting in January, auction rate municipals began routinely failing, or at best, resetting at rates considerably higher than the SIFMA or LIBOR indices. In other words, the pay-floating side of the interest rate swap was substantially lower than the actual amount being paid by the sewer system.

Because the sewer system was so leveraged, the extra interest expense was more than their budget could bear. Had they been a stronger credit, the sewer system probably could have refinanced their auction-rate debt with variable rate put bonds. That structure offers investors a weekly put option, and therefore has not suffered the liquidity problems of auction-rate bonds. Or they might have been able to cancel the swap arrangements and refinance their debt as fixed rate. But because of the extreme leverage employed and the rapid deterioration of what balance sheet they had, these options were not viable.

S&P has lowered the Jefferson County Sewer bond rating to CCC, with Moody's currently rating the system at B3. The rating had been A with both agencies as recently as mid-February.

Is bankruptcy in the cards? Probably not. The County, which isn't legally responsible for the sewer bonds, has proposed to redirect sales tax revenue to the extent it is not needed for school construction. It is not clear whether this would be enough to satisfy the sewer systems debt service needs, primarily because of uncertainty surrounding their outstanding swap arrangements.

The sewer system's swap agreements require it to post collateral in the event of a credit rating downgrade. According to the Bond Buyer, that figure is currently $184 million, which the County has yet to post, and is now past due. The swaps counter-parties are unlikely to push the collateral issue too hard, as the bond documents indicate that the swap providers are subordinate to bond investors.

So it seems the most likely outcome will be that banks and the County will work out some sort of restructuring. It would likely involve the County pledging certain revenues, a refinancing of their $869 million in auction rate debt, and some sort of restructuring of their swap arrangements. So bankruptcy cannot be ruled out, but it does seem there are too many interested parties who would rather see another solution.

Could the same thing happen to other issuers? Absolutely. Fortunately for general market municipal investors, the confluence of events leading to Jefferson County's problems are indeed rare. Most of the biggest issuers of ARS are either student loan-related, where max rates are very low, or relatively strong issuers, such as the City of New York, who will be able to refinance without trouble. The problems are most likely to crop up with small issuers, particularly private non-profits (e.g. a hospital or private college), who have entered into onerous swaps. These are issuers with limited resources, and also lack the political support that a sewer system enjoys.

It is a bit worrisome for many municipal investors that an issuer can go from A to CCC in less than 30 days. Gee, maybe bond insurance isn't dead after all.

Thursday, March 27, 2008

Synthetic ABS. Who needs 'em anyway?

Plans to create an auto loan ABS (asset-backed security) index, similar to the now infamous ABX index except for auto loans instead of home equity loans, were quietly scuttled last week. Creation of such an index would have allowed investors to buy and sell credit default swaps on a basket of auto loan securitizations, in effect, betting on the credit performance.

Why was it canceled? Partially because of the severe drop off in securitizations of consumer loans generally, there aren't a lot of recent auto loan deals to put into an efficient index. But there is a deeper issue. Many market participants are now questioning the value of these CDS indices. It was once thought that a more easily traded index of CDS would help improve price discovery in the asset-backed market. But is that what's happening now?

The market is only going to efficiently price a security when there is reasonable two-way flow. In other words, when a price is reached where there is a reasonable number of traders on both the short and long side. Is this what's been happening with the ABX index? No. Whatever you think of where actual value is on various ABX contracts, it certainly isn't a two-way market. Buyers of protection have dominated that market for about a year now. Of course there has to be a seller if there is a buyer, but I've persistently heard that sellers of protection have overwhelmingly been either paired trades along the capital structure (e.g., long the 2007-1 BBB and short 2007-2 BBB) or short covering.

Now one can look at any of the specific structures in the ABX library and make a case that the price should be higher or lower. That isn't the point. The point is that the ABX never developed natural buyers of risk. Once home equity structures became distressed, there were some buyers of cash bonds. But these are the kinds of buyers who want to comb through the structures and carefully analyze every dollar of cash flow. That kind of buyer is looking for a cash-flow diamond in the rough. Selling protection on the ABX is a bet on home equity spreads in general tightening. That's not the kind of bet distressed buyers like to make.

Meanwhile, with so few home equity bonds actually trading, the ABX became the only means of estimating a market value on home loan bonds. So right or wrong, the ABX became the "mark to market" for pricing many different types of mortgage-related paper. Buyers who were careful to buy higher quality home equity paper complained, as they believed they had better structures than those on which the ABX is based. But it didn't matter since there were no new deals with which to compare, the ABX is all auditors had to use as a base.

The negative feedback was severe. (Notice I didn't say it was a "loop") Any real money buyer who tried buying high quality home equity paper saw their marks based on the lower-quality ABX. Portfolio managers are hard-pressed to buy bonds, regardless of the fundamental value, if the mark is going to be substantially lower. With no real money buyers and liquidity very poor, it became impossible to securitize any mortgage-related paper.

What would have been better for all involved is if the market had been allowed to price bonds individually based on individual risk characteristics. Perhaps the dislocation in the mortgage market was too severe for that to have realistically happened. But the ABX caused everything to be priced on a lowest-common-denominator basis. That really didn't help anyone other than the shorts.

So given all this, it seems obvious why various market participants aren't too eager to create another ABX monster. Its true that default rates on auto loans are likely to rise significantly, both due to normal recessionary pressure as well as the weak housing market. But its also true that auto loan deals have been priced to take much greater losses than home loan paper ever was. Home loans were always modeled with the assumption that the collateral was an appreciating asset. Car loans never made this assumption. In fact, Fitch estimates that most AAA-rated auto loan deals can withstand 20% unemployment.

So the street would rather auto loan securitizations stand on their own cash flow results, rather than suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous technicals. There is a right price for ABS risk. Maybe, just maybe, finding that right price will allow the securitization market to make a slow comeback, at least outside of home loans. That will be a critical next step for solidifying market liquidity.

Tuesday, March 25, 2008

The credit market's Bacta Tank

The market's reaction to Bear Stearn's demise has been impressive. The stock market story has been well-covered, but the credit market story is really the one to watch.

Right now we have two major themes in the credit markets. The first is a real economy recession, with a very weak housing market at its epicenter. The second is a battered financial sector, where strained capital and fear of spiraling contagion has caused a dearth of liquidity.

A real economy recession should legitimately cause the price of taking risk to rise. In the case of mortgage-related credit risk, for instance the ABX index, prices should obviously be drastically lower. This is the kind of risk pricing that capital markets can handle. In fact, that kind of risk pricing is exactly why capital markets are an important part of our free-market system. We need a market where various risks are correctly priced, as this helps to channel capital to areas where it is most needed.

But the second major theme is interfering with the market's ability to properly price risks. Potential buyers of risk, from hedge funds to banks to broker/dealers, became overextended during the credit bull market and now need to repair their their own balance sheets. No matter how attractive various pricing levels are, these buyers are are not a position to take advantage. Some of those that became overextended have been forced to unwind some or all of their positions. In many cases, such as the liquidation of municipal bond arbitrage programs, the problem had nothing to do with actual credit losses. But given the weak liquidity, any large scale selling caused prices to plunge.

As a result, classic investment analysis, pouring over 10K's and analyzing cash flows, has not been a winning strategy. Until very recently, investors who dabbled in anything that looked fundamentally "cheap" got burned. Sector after sector suffered historic spread widening amidst persistent forced selling. This created a negative feedback loop, as real money investors sit on the sidelines waiting for some semblance of calm before putting their cash to work.

The never few weeks will test whether that negative feedback loop has broken. Municipal yields have been falling. 10-year Fannie Mae debt spreads have dropped about 35bps since Friday, and are now as tight as they've been since early February. Agency MBS spreads are about where they were at the beginning of March. Brokerage CDS are actually tighter month-to-date.

This is important because it means that there are investors who bought good bonds on recent dips and enjoyed good results. This is what it will take to break the negative feedback loop in the bond market.

Whatever you think of where the economy is heading, the system needs efficient pricing of risk. Persistently bad technicals have been getting in the way of this healthy process. Watch interest rate swaps spreads, GSE debt spreads, and agency-backed MBS spreads to see if this follows through.

Wednesday, March 19, 2008

What I'm hearing...

  • Bank and brokerage bonds continue to perform well. The most recent quotes I've seen on Lehman Brothers, for example, are as tight as I've seen over the last couple days. It doesn't look like they've backed off materially during this late-date stock market swoon. We'll see.
  • CMBS spreads are moving much tighter today. I'm not big into that market, so I'm just throwing that out there for color.
  • Credit spreads outside of finance appear to be mildly tighter, if anything.
  • Swap spreads are mixed, with 2-year spreads 4bps wider while 10-year 3bps tighter. Agency spreads moving similarly.
  • Deleveraging continues. All the big brokers know that the surest way to avoid a Bear Stearns problem is to make sure they aren't over exposed to hedge funds. Supposedly there have been several commodities-oriented funds which are selling today. Gold getting crushed. Haven't heard anything about equity-oriented funds but that might be part of what's going on today as well.
  • Also hearing that good old John Merriweather's fund, JWM Partners, is down 20%+ in March. Supposedly had exposure to Carlyle.
  • Agency MBS spreads are tighter today. News that FNM and FRE will be allowed to expand their portfolio may well be a game changer in the MBS world. Two weeks ago news like the JWM rumor would have just killed the MBS market.
  • Put the deleveraging story and the stock market story together with the mildly tigher credit/MBS spread story and it doesn't seem to fit. I can only conclude that there aren't alot of hedge funds left that are both 1) net long credit and/or MBS and 2) haven't already been hit with margin calls.
  • Also interesting to note that even hedge fund trades that have been working, e.g., long commodities, are getting hit by deleveraging. It may have merely been that the credit and MBS-oriented funds were the first to get hit by deleveraging.
  • Speaking of popular hedge fund trades, my bet would be that fast money is net short investment-grade credit. That could be another reason why credit spreads have been resilient today.

I'd love to hear comments on what others are seeing today.

Monday, March 17, 2008

Update on the Precipice...

Some updates for those who don't sit in front of Bloombergs...

5-year brokerage bonds...
Lehman Brothers: Now, +560/540. Open, 625/595. Last trade on Friday was +510.
Goldman Sachs: Now, +280/260. Open, 290/280. Friday, 260.
Merrill Lynch: Now, +415/405. Open, 470/460. Friday, 400.
Morgan Stanley: Now, +330/310. Open, 350/340. No size trades on Friday, but seemed to be about +300.

Swap spreads continue to perform very well. 10-years 8 tighter today, 2-years 9 tighter. Agency spreads improving as well, 10-year Fannie's about 3 tighter than Friday, 2-year about 6 tighter.

Lehman is of course the name to watch. Here is what I've heard. Working against them is that they had the second largest mortgage exposure on the street (after Bear of course). Working for them is that they actually have more cash than their rivals. I've heard they have cash and near-cash of $100 billion which is 5 times what Bear supposedly had as of last week. According to one trader I was talking to, Goldman doesn't even have that much cash. I'm watching Lehman's credit spread much more closely than their stock. If their credit spread holds, that would indicate that the market believes in the Fed's lender-of-last-resort role. The stock might fall regardless, as all the brokers are probably going to have to lever down and that will hurt profits.

Also, remember that the Fed isn't trying to "solve" anything. In other words, the Fed's near-term goals do not include preventing home prices (or even stock prices) from falling. The Fed's goal is to make sure that the system continues to function. If the stock market stabilizes, that would be a sign the Fed's actions are working. But a better sign would be that bank CDS spreads stabilize. That's what we need to watch now.

The Precipice

There is a lot about the Bear Stearns bailout story we don't yet know, so I don't have too much to say about it. Obviously the $2/share price tag is the scariest part. Anyway, I thought I'd throw out some stuff from my markets that you might not see elsewhere.

  • Clearly if Bear Stearns was only worth $2/share, then Lehman and the other brokers are worth far less than what they were worth on Friday. And that doesn't have anything to do with their actual assets or liabilities, but that if someone else needs a bailout, its going to look similar to the JPM/BSC deal. So even if you assume that the odds of another firm needing a bailout are relatively low (say 10%), that's a 10% chance that the firm is worth essentially zero.
  • Why the hell is Bear stock trading at $4?!? Now I'll admit that there is a chance that another buyer would have paid more for BSC. But I can't imagine another buyer emerging now. By all accounts, the Fed orchestrated this from start to finish. I mean, J.C. Flowers was a bidder, but would the Fed want J.C. Flowers to have bought Bear? Hell no. J.P. Morgan was one of just a handful of financial institutions in the world that would bring unquestioned stability to Bear's balance sheet. Once the Fed got JPM involved, the Fed wasn't going to let anyone other than JPM to finish the deal.
  • As I'm writing this, the Dow is down 20 and the S&P is only down 10. Nothing, nothing, would surprise me today. Down 500? Up 200? Who knows? What we have is a tug of war. Traders betting on things getting worse. The Fed and Treasury are trying to draw a line in the sand, telling the market they won't let either banks nor primary dealers fail as long as they still have decent assets to pledge as collateral. The Traders have momentum on their side, the Fed has gigantic piles of cash on their side.
  • Speaking of the Fed's weapons, someday when we really know everything about what really happened at Bear Stearns, it will be interesting to see whether Bear would have survived if they had access to the discount window and/or the TSLF. In other words, had the Fed acted quicker to extend liquidity to dealers, would be have been better off?
  • Spreads on interest rate swaps, which is viewed as a broad measure of counter-party risk, are substantially tighter today, about -5bps on 10-year swaps and -7 on 2-year swaps. Doesn't sound like much, but that's a pretty big move for swaps.
  • Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae debt spreads are also tighter, but only by 1-2bps.
  • Agency MBS are performing in-line with Treasuries. That's encouraging, as MBS rarely keep up with Treasuries when rates are falling.
  • Credit spreads are definitively wider, but I'm hearing there is little conviction either way in cash bonds. I will say that I wouldn't be a buyer of protection against any of the big banks or brokerages here. The Fed just delivered a big middle finger to people who bet against Bear Stearns. If you want to bet against brokerages, the stock is a much smarter bet. The Fed doesn't give a fuck if a stock falls 50%. They have basically unlimited power to prevent a bankruptcy.
  • Moody's affirmed Lehman's A1 rating this morning, after Lehman secured a $3 billion credit line on Friday. This doesn't mean very much, even forgetting the ratings agencies recent poor record on rating mortgage deals. The problems brokerages are facing today have nothing to do with the normal financial ratio-type analysis that the ratings agencies do. In fact, for a guy like me who likes to pour over financial statements when making an investment decision, analyzing credits now is next to impossible.
  • Lehman and Goldman's earnings reports tomorrow are probably the most important earnings reports for the broad economy of my career.
  • We're going to get 100bps tomorrow.

Good luck to Bear Stearns employees.

Thursday, March 13, 2008

Do you think that after what you did to Han we're going to trust you?

The S&P piece that got the market excited is available here, you have to register but its free. I mentioned some points about writedowns in this post. Basically I think that the most big U.S. brokers have substantially written down what they need to. Doesn't mean they have zero writedowns going forward, just that what they do have will be smaller. My view on this has been bolstered by recent comments from Vakrim Pandit and John Thain, both saying they wouldn't seek more outside capital, as well as Alan Schwartz saying that Bear Stearns' balance sheet was unchanged from the previous quarter. I mean, Schwartz can't come out and say that the balance sheet was unchanged from last quarter on CNBC on March 12, then reveal a $1 billion writedown when they announce earnings on March 20.

As I said in Tuesday's comments, however, that doesn't mean we're out of the woods and the credit bear market is over. It just means that we enter a new phase in the healing process. See, dealer capital is going to be constrained for a while here. I personally wonder if constrained capital wasn't part of the reason why the 10-year auction was lackluster. That means liquidity in all areas of fixed income will be less than you'd otherwise expect. That's the world we're going to be living in for the next year or two regardless of what else happens to the economy.

Anyway, so people love to talk about what inning we're in when it comes to the subprime crisis. But let's be more positive about it, shall we? We're in the first inning of the healing process. The subprime contagion has decimated broker/dealer capital. That phase is probably wrapping up. We've also seen the contagion all but eliminate SIV-based ABCP and auction-rate securities. So that phase is over too.

The contagion tried to really wreck the municipal bond market, but the early indications are that market is starting to function more normally. The contagion is also trying to really wreck the agency MBS market, but even in the face of Carlyle's liquidation, MBS spreads actually tightened today. So maybe, maybe, that's another area where the contagion will be contained.

To say things are getting better is a bad way of thinking about it. The data continues to be bad. But in order to move forward, we've got to contain the contagion. Once the unbridled fear subsides, then we can get to the business of properly pricing various risks. We're getting there. Slowly.

Wednesday, March 12, 2008

It's just a dead animal

Rumors that Bear Stearns was having liquidity problems sent the credit markets reeling on Monday, and briefly had Bear's stock bucking yesterday's dramatic rally. I heard (could not confirm) that Bear CDS briefly hit 1,100. By late afternoon it had settled down to about 600. On Friday Bear CDS was around 465.

Now I'm not here to say whether Bear Stearns has liquidity problems or not. The recovery in both the stock and bond market for Bear paper would indicate that they probably don't. But this kind of panicky trading is exactly why its hard to own financial bonds right now. I mean, anyone who had traded through bear markets knows that the rumor mill becomes very active. Right now everyone is nervous. The longs are nervous because they've been losing money and/or under performing their index for months now. I'm sure there are many portfolio managers and/or traders worried about losing their jobs over poor performance.

The shorts are nervous too. Right now corporate credit spreads are at all-time wides. That means that getting short a credit is expensive to begin with. For example, if you assume Bear Stearns CDS is at 600, that means it will cost you 6% of your notional bet annually to short Bear Stearns. In order to make up 6% in carry costs, you need something like a 175bps widening of the CDS spread. Now obviously 175bps of widening is possible given that it moved to 1,000 in a day, and if the move happens quickly then you don't incur the whole 6% in carry costs. Still, it comes to the point where you have to really bet they are going bankrupt, not just going to have problems.

On top of that, with spreads at all-time wides, the shorts know that spreads (speaking generally) are bound to tighten at some point. When this might happen is any one's guess, but its clear that the risk/reward of a generalized credit short is getting harder and harder.

So amidst all this nervousness, it seems that Wall Street starts giving more credence to rumors. In the last 5 trading days we've gone from a rumor that Treasury was going to guarantee GSE debt (scaring the shorts) to a rumor that Bear Stearns was teetering (scaring the longs) to a rumor that WaMu would get a capital infusion from Warren Buffett (scaring the shorts again). Look for more of the same in the coming months.

Tuesday, March 11, 2008

What will bring an end to the credit bear market?

So readers seem to want to hear about what I think could end this credit bear market. Of course I wrote most of this before the Dow surged 300 points today. And hey, maybe this will mark the bottom of the credit market. We'll see. I for one am not pouring into financial bonds right now, and I'm betting neither are a lot of real money buyers. Ironically, in talking to fixed-income portfolio managers and traders, it is almost universally held that credit spreads for investment-grade corporate bonds are too wide. That in 12-24 months bond spreads will have tightened significantly. And yet the same people are also very cautious about adding positions right now. In other words, people who believe certain bonds are fundamentally cheap are unwilling to actually buy the same bonds. Hence the severe bear market in corporate bonds continues.

What would bring an end to this bear market? Simple. Bear markets end when the market runs out of sellers. More on this in a bit. First, let's look at what won't end the bear market.

When the economy improves?
Nope. During the 2000-2002 credit bear market, the economy was already on the upswing by 4Q 2001, but credit spreads didn't peak until 4Q 2002. At that time, accounting scandals (Enron, Worldcom, etc.) caused investors to lose confidence in financial statements in general. Any company which made the most minor of accounting restatements saw their bond spreads widen dramatically. Fear of accounting surprises kept credit investors away.

The current market might turn out to be similar. Even if the economy starts to rebound at some point in 2008, fear that subprime losses will pop up in unexpected places may keep spreads wide.

When banks and broker/dealers have adequately written down subprime securities and loans?
Nah. See, we won't know when that's happened. Consider...

  • We don't know what the right number is for losses. $300 billion? $400 billion? $800 billion? Even if there were $400 billion in write downs already, there'd be plenty of commentators claiming more write downs were coming.
  • We don't know how much of the eventual write downs are held in private hands, and therefore will never show up in a public tally.
  • Some of the losses which will hit public companies will come in the form of failed hedge funds. The losses at the hedge fund are really part of the subprime tally, but may not be reported as such by the bank/brokerage.
  • The accounting treatment for various subprime exposed positions differs. There won't be explicit "write downs" for all of the eventual losses.
The bottom line is that write downs are going to continue. Some firms may have already written down and/or sold all their impaired positions, others probably have a long way to go. But even if, say, Morgan Stanley announces zero RMBS writedowns when they next report earnings, market sentiment is so negative that people won't believe them. After all, when Morgan Stanley reported 4Q earnings they announced that they only had $1.8 billion in subprime exposure, suggesting that possible future write downs would, at worst, be small. That's hardly stemmed the spread widening in Morgan Stanley bonds.

When housing prices bottom?
That's not it either. Again, we contemporaneously know when prices have bottomed. For one, most data on home prices had a serious lag, for example, the Case Shiller figures are two months old by the time we get them. Besides, we'd need several reports of moderating price declines before anyone would believe the market had bottomed. Imagine what would happen if the next Case-Shiller report showed that prices were flat in the last month. Would anyone really believe the housing crisis was over? Or would you figure that we hit a lull and price declines would soon continue?

The same would be true for other housing health indicators, such as default rates on mortgage loans. We'll need several months to know we've bottomed. By then it might be too late to be in credit.

When confidence in the financial system returns?
Uh uh. Just like every bear market, confidence doesn't return all at once. No one will make an announcement that now the banking system is perfectly stable and its OK to buy credit. By the time confidence is restored, credit spreads will be dramatically tighter.

When buyers start nibbling in credit?
I don't think so. Whenever someone sells a bond, someone must be buying it. So it isn't like there are no buyers at all. Plus from November on we've heard of plenty of stories of smart portfolio managers coming in to buy credit, MBS, commercial MBS, bank loans, etc. Unfortunately, every single time anyone has nibbled on anything, they've gotten crushed. Just last week, Bill Gross was reportedly buying CMBS, as well as Thornburg MBS. So people have been and will continue to nibble on these beat up securities.

The problem has been that there are so many willing sellers, and not just of highly distressed subprime or LBO bank loans, but of plan vanilla corporate bonds. Every time a modicum of demand emerges, its met with even larger selling.

So spreads won't tighten until sellers are exhausted. That may take a while longer. The maturation of the CDS market has made it easier and cheaper than ever to bet against a credit. At some point the cost of buying CDS protection will give short-sellers pause, but for now the momentum is so strong against credit, that the quarterly CDS contract payments must seem like a minor inconvenience. But the time will come where fast money decides that credit is oversold. Buying protection won't seem like such an easy trade.

The bottom line is that you have to look at the fundamentals of a given credit. If you think a bond is paying you the right amount to own it, then buy it. Otherwise, move on to something else. Trying to time the bottom in this market will be unusually difficult.

Saturday, March 08, 2008

Return of Capital

Investors are more worried about return of capital these days, and not as much with return on capital. This most starkly evidenced by the nominal yield on 2-year Treasury Inflation Protected bonds is currently negative, about -0.72%. This means that buyers of this bond are happy to accept negative real returns over the next two years. Obviously investors would only accept such a situation during a time when fear is at extreme levels.

But investors won't accept negative real returns forever. And the fear levels have created some very easy opportunities to outperform Treasury yields. No, I'm not talking about MBIA's 14% surplus note or sub-prime closed-end second lien bullshit. Take Ginnie Mae (GNMA) mortgage-backed securities (MBS). GNMA securities are backed by the full-faith and credit of the U.S. Government, so the credit quality is exactly the same as a Treasury bond. The cash flow for these securities is equal to the cash flow that is paid by borrowers, so when a borrower sends in $1 of interest, bond holders get that $1 of interest. If they pay $1 of principal, $1 of principal is repaid to bond holders (well, not exactly, but close enough). If any borrower defaults, Ginnie Mae buys the loan out of the pool, returning 100% of the principal amount to bond holders.

As of Thursday close, GNMA securities with a 6% coupon based on 30-year fixed-rate mortgage loans were trading about $101.5. What your yield would be depends on how quickly the bond repays principal. Since principal is repaid at $100, faster repayments would lower your return.

So let's look at how fast prepayments might occur. At the height of the refi wave in 2004, GNMA 6% mortgages prepaid principal at a 44% annualized clip. If that prepayment rate reoccurred over the next 12 months, assuming a zero reinvestment rate, investors would earn 3.72%. Hey! That might actually keep up with inflation!

Of course, the mortgage market is quite different today versus 2004. First of all, 30-year fixed mortgage rates fell as low as 5.45%. Today we're still stuck just over 6%. Second, mortgage credit was very easy to come by. Today? Its the worst mortgage credit environment in generations. So the odds of seeing 44% prepayments seems unlikely. In fact, prepayment rates over the last 6 months have ranged from 9.5 to 15.6%, with an average of 12.9%. If prepayment rates stayed at 12.9% over the next 12 months, the GNMA investor would earn 5.19%. Don't look now, but that yield level is higher than 5-year Goldman Sachs, Wachovia, or Bank of America paper. By the way, if you are feeling frisky, the yields on Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac guaranteed MBS are even higher.

Of course, I say you'd "earn" 3.72% or 5.19% in yield, but what about price return? Indeed, MBS prices have suffered particularly over the last 6 weeks amidst horrible technicals. Leveraged MBS players are seeing their allowed margins reduced. Mortgage originators sold like mad in late February to try to get ahead of more expensive Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae pricing. Banks are not adding to positions, if not selling themselves. MBS prices fell about 1/2 of a point Thursday(while Treasuries rose more than 1/2 of a point) after the story hit that Thornburg had been served with a default notice. They recovered a bit on Friday.

On the positive side, supply technicals are excellent. You may have heard that housing turnover is extremely low, and bank credit is extremely tight. There won't be a flood of mortgage supply for the market to swallow.

So yes, perhaps the technicals of MBS are difficult right now, but the fundamentals are excellent. Maybe the demand for MBS will come in the form of money managers and retail investors who finally tire of Treasury yields below 2%. How long it will take before this happens is any one's guess. But if you are going to be a fundamental investor, you can't be overly concerned with waiting for a bottom. Similar to what happened in municipals, eventually buyers come in to buy when the value proposition becomes easy to understand. I think MBS have reached this point.

Thursday, March 06, 2008

Municipal Bonds: Yeeeeaaaaahooooooo!

Municipal bond yields are falling fast after hitting record highs versus Treasury bonds on Friday. Late last week, municipal arbitrage funds were being hit with margin calls, as their hedges were rapidly moving against them. This lead to billions of dollars in forced selling, which when pushed on the relatively illiquid municipal market, caused prices to plummet. On Friday, high quality municipals were widely available at spreads of 100bps or more above Treasury rates. Typically municipals yield about 80% of Treasury rates.

Initially word on the street was that these historic levels were enticing hedge funds and other non-traditional muni buyers (even Bill Gross) to buy tax-exempt munis. This was good news and bad news of course. It meant that there was indeed capital in the system to ensure that the muni market would clear. The bad news was that these non-traditional buyers would only be around as long as muni prices were stupid cheap. In other words, this was fast money, and fast money never sparks a persistent rally. Fast money is always looking to take its profit and get out. At best, these non-traditional buyers would merely prevent the muni market from going lower still.

But the initial read was apparently wrong. On Monday, retail buyers (i.e., mom and pop investors) started coming out of the woodwork to buy bonds. The State of California came with a $1.7 billion deal on Monday. Demand was so strong that the underwriter cut the interest rate by 15bps across the board, and still $1 billion of the deal was done retail. Now maybe there has been $1 billion of a deal done retail in the past, but I sure as hell don't remember ever hearing of such a thing. Smith Barney, Citigroup's retail brokerage arm, supposedly had the best day for selling municipal bonds in their entire history on Monday. One large dealer I talk to regularly said they had sold every bond in their inventory by 11AM.

Overall, municipal bond rates are probably 15bps lower today than on Friday, while Treasury rates are about 15bps higher. Strong retail demand is critical for improvement in the muni market. First it means that long-term buyers are soaking up the massive supply hitting the market. Second it means that long-term buyers have not lost confidence in municipals amidst the bond insurer problems.

So what happened to the arb fund selling? I've heard that the arb funds had to meet margin calls on Friday, but seem to now have adequate margin to move forward. That being said, we are still seeing selling from arb funds, but its coming in the form of smaller lists of offerings as opposed to bid lists. The difference is the degree of desperation. A bid list means you need cash now, an offering list means you will sell bonds but only if you get your price.

The bottom line is that the muni market looks a lot stronger than I initiall expected.

Tuesday, March 04, 2008

What the hell is going on with munis?

To understand what's happening in munis, and why its got so many people worried, you first have to understand how it used to work. You know, way back in early 2007.

When a municipality wanted to do a bond issue, they would hire an investment bank, who would normally invite other investment banks into the deal to help sell it. Not unlike what happens with corporate bond or even equity IPOs. The lead investment bank would decide on an interest rate it thought was the right level to sell the bonds. They'd set the level a little higher than the market, in the hopes of selling the deal quickly. Remember that a municipal bond issue is underwritten, meaning that the investment bank has committed to buy the issue from the municipality, and is taking the risk that they can sell the deal to the public.

Way back in early 2007, that risk seemed like no big deal. If a bond deal didn't sell in its entirety, the dealer would just put the bonds out on its retail system and sell them to mom and pop $5,000 at a time. Given the underwriting fee the investment bank earned, the risk of holding low volatility municipals for a week or so made a lot of sense.

Fast forward to today. Investment banks are generally strapped for capital. What capital they do have is not being heavily allocated to a low margin area like municipals. And a lot of the dealers' municipal capital is tied up in auction rate bonds.

So what happens when an investment banks is trying to underwrite a municipal deal but have been told not to use any of the firm's capital? They have to "pre-sell" the entire issue, meaning that the bank's customers have committed to the deal before the official sale. No big deal, right? Just set the price a little higher than the market, just like muni underwriters have been doing for years, and demand will come, right?

Well, not so fast. New issue muni supply is extremely large right now: over $8.4 billion in new issues are expected next week. A lot of that is auction-rate securities being refinanced. On top of that, there has been consistent selling from various municipal arbitrage strategies, such as tender-option programs. These strategies have been squeezed by bad hedges and insurer-related downgrades, and are currently flooding the market with bid lists.

Normal muni demand from mutual funds, insurance companies, and mom and pop investors just can't keep up with that kind of selling. And with dealers unwilling to inventory bonds themselves, that means that they have to make new deals so cheap as to entice non-traditional muni buyers into the market. In other words, vulture investors. The same people who have stepped in to buy auction-rate munis yielding 8% are now being invited into the fixed-rate muni market.

What's the result? Friday it was possible to buy 5-year pre-refunded municipals (which are backed by Treasury bonds held in escrow) at yields in the 3.50's. In other words, around 80bps higher than Treasury rates. That is literally Treasury credit at a 80bps spread to Treasuries tax-exempt. Dozens of large new issue municipal deals came at significant spreads to Treasury rates.

The hedge funds are smelling blood in the water, and are moving in quickly. I've heard from multiple sources that non-traditional muni buyers, from hedge funds to taxable bond investors, lifted everything in the street yesterday. That's good news and bad news of course. It means that the muni market is indeed clearing. But it also means that muni rates can't move substantially lower (at least versus Treasury rates) until we get through this glut of new issue supply created by auction-rate refinancings and arb selling. These vulture investors don't really represent new demand for munis long-term, merely that if the street is going to absolutely give away municipals, there are buyers who will take them.

A trader I talked to today told one of his hedge fund clients that municipals were feeling like a falling knife. The customer responded that the ABX index was a falling knife. This is at worst a butter knife.

Friday, February 29, 2008

Auction Rate Securities: Hibernation sickness

Has all the good news on bond insurers improved the auction rate municipal bond market? Taking another look at the results of J.P. Morgan's auctions reveals that the ARS market is indeed thawing a bit. Morgan held 103 bond auctions on Tuesday, 47 of which failed. Looking a little deeper, however, and we see that all the failed auctions occurred where the bond had a relatively low "max rate." Remember that when an auction fails, there is some pre-determined rate at which the bond resets.

For example, some very strong credits failed on Tuesday, such as some New York Dorm Authority bonds with FSA insurance and a AA underlying rating. The failure had nothing to do with the credit, but for the fact that the "max rate" was only 4.688%. Holders of these bonds not only have zero liquidity, but an unexciting reset rate to boot.

Among the successful auctions, rates ranged from 4.00% to 10.24%, with a median rate of 6.755%. While these rate resets will not grab headlines like the 20%-type rates seen over the last couple weeks, 6.75% is still about 450bps higher than where money-market eligible munis are trading.

So while we might say the ARS market is starting to function on a certain level, there should be little doubt about its future. Municipal issuers are highly likely to refinance these securities over the next 3-6 months, either into traditional put-bond structures or long-term fixed-rate bonds. There may not be such a thing as an auction rate municipal market this time next year.

Worth noting that this doesn't seem to have anything to do with the improved picture for MBIA and Amabc, as the difference between failed and successful auctions seems to have everything to do with the available rate. In other words, it reads like there is capital available for non-liquid municipals as long as the rate is right. Insurance doesn't seem to matter.

Thursday, February 28, 2008

What does a AAA mean anyway?

S&P has affirmed MBIA's insurance sub's rating at AAA, and has removed it from negative watch. MBIA does remain on negative outlook. In credit ratings parlance, no longer being on watch means a downgrade is not imminent. The negative outlook reflects the simple fact that MBIA may well fail to regain a AAA-level reputation, regardless of the AAA rating. If they fail to regain their reputation, their business will not ultimately recover. But for financial institutions with exposure to MBIA, chief among which was Merrill Lynch, this is unequivocally good news.

S&P wasn't done doling out the good news. They also affirmed Ambac's AAA rating, although Ambac remains on negative watch. Normally negative watch indicates that a downgrade is imminent. In this case, however, S&P indicated that Ambac was about $400 million short of the capital level needed for a stable AAA rating. Therefore if Ambac is able to complete the capital infusion plan reportedly in the works, which will supposedly raise $3 billion, they should be able to retain their rating. Several reports indicated that the only thing holding up the negotiations between Ambac and the banks is a sign-off by the ratings agencies, and I'd say today's report from S&P tells us that at least one agency would indeed sign-off.

The market continues to be highly skeptical of these ratings. CDS on both MBIA and Ambac's AAA-rated insurance subs are still well over 300, roughly in line with BBB+ rated Washington Mutual, wider than A rated Bear Stearns.

Now we can quibble about S&P's methodology of estimating "stressed losses" on mortgage-related securities. For 2007 vintage tranched RMBS rated A or lower, S&P assumed at least a 84%+ loss rates on Alt-A and closed-end second mortgages, and home equity lines of credit. On first-lien sub-prime loans the loss rates are slightly better, no doubt owing to somewhat better recovery. The 2006 vintage loss estimates are similar, with some product worse and other product better.

On ABS CDOs, S&P assumed loss rates of around 60% on higher-rated collateral and 80% on lower-rated collateral for the '06 and '07 vintages. Given that the monolines generally only insured the most senior tranches of ABS CDOs, that probably puts the eventual monoline losses on these products in the 40% area.

So like I said, we can quibble about whether or not that represents a "stressed" scenario or not. The reality is, it doesn't matter what we think. If S&P says that Ambac and MBIA have enough capital to be called AAA, then they are AAA. Banks will now use AAA ratings when calculating their capital ratios. Money market funds can keep holding insured paper.

It especially doesn't matter what we think because neither Ambac nor MBIA is in any real danger of running out of cash in the near term. Ambac and MBIA reported over $18 and $35 billion in marketable securities respectively as of 4Q 2007. Plenty to pay any losses they are likely to incur over the next several quarters. So if the monolines aren't going to actually run out of cash, if they aren't actually going to go bankrupt, who is to say they aren't AAA?

And that's what bothers me. When you come down to it, the debate over whether the monolines should or should not be rated AAA is entirely subjective. We all agree that a AAA-rated bond should have a remote chance of taking losses, but how remote is remote? We all agree that a AAA-rated insurer should be able to withstand a 6-sigma event, but what constitutes a 6-sigma event? There is no single answer to these questions. Its subjective.

That would be OK, except that credit ratings are so ingrained in our financial system. Everything from banking and insurance regulations, mutual funds, money markets, pension funds, debt service reserve accounts, etc. all depend on a ratings system to guide them. Try sometime sitting down and reading the SEC 2A-7 rule, which governs money market investments. The rules all but encourage managers to buy whatever they want as long as the instrument has the right rating and right maturity. And yet if 2007 taught us anything, its that credit ratings are just opinions. No matter how sophisticated the modeling and financial analysis, those opinions can be just plain wrong.

On Monday, the Dow rallied nearly 200 points, and credit spreads almost universally tightened. Why? Because a AAA rating for MBIA and Ambac means that banks won't have to pledge more capital against downgraded ABS. This gives them more capital to lend into the economy. No matter what you think of S&P's analysis, that's the reality. If that reality bothers you, perhaps your derision should not be aimed at S&P or MBIA, but at the banking regulations that are so heavily reliant on ratings.

Wednesday, February 27, 2008

S&P on the monolines: No problem. Why?

S&P and Moody's have now both affirmed MBIA. S&P also more or less said they would affirm Ambac as well if the reported $3 billion capital infusion is completed. MBIA's infamous 14% surplus note is now trading comfortably above par ($101 bid, $104 offer last night). So are we out of the woods with the monolines?


Well let's start by looking at S&P's methodology. In short, S&P will bestow a AAA rating if they believe an insurer can survive their "stressed" scenario. Here are their assumptions for various types of mortgage-related securities.


First, the cumulative losses for various types of loans. Note these are losses, not default rates. If you assume, say 50% recovery on first liens, then the default rates assumed would be roughly double what you see here. For some context, during the 2001 recession subprime default rates got as high as 9%, so clearly these loss rates are a multiple of historic norms, even during a recession.



Table 2 shows S&P's loss assumptions on direct RMBS transactions. That's where the monoline has insured a pool of loans directly, as opposed to a tranche of a RMBS transaction. So here a AAA-rated RMBS tranche means that S&P estimated the whole pool was worth a AAA at the outset.


Table 3 is starting to get to the real problems. What they mean by a "tranched" RMBS is one where there is a subordination credit enhancement. In other words, losses hit the lower-rated tranches first, and higher rated tranches only if the lower-rated pieces are completely wiped out.


You can't get much worse than those 2006-2007 loss levels, even on AA-rated tranches. Note that these loss levels will dictate the loss levels on ABS CDOs, which is table 4.


I noted in a previous post that CDOs was the monolines biggest exposure, so this table is the real kicker. Remember that the monolines basically only insured senior tranches of CDOs, so these loss rates would seem to represent an assumption that all the subordination will turn out to be worthless. When they say "high-grade" CDOs, they mean a CDO made up of ABS paper rated A or better. That does mean that the transaction is more leveraged, i.e., there is less subordination under the AAA-rated tranche. "Mezzanine" CDOs were usuallly made up of paper rated A or BBB. Since a lot of these mezz ABS pieces are turning out to be worthless, its not surprising that the CDOs are going to take huge losses. I'd say the only thing preventing these losses from being 100% is that most CDOs had more than just RMBS in them, and not all that paper will turn out to be worthless.

So all in all, I'd say that's a pretty stressful scenario.

Saturday, February 23, 2008

Monolines: Now witness the destructive power!

New CEO Jay Brown at MBIA is considering a good bank/bad bank split. We talked about this idea a bit with Ambac on Wednesday. Now let's talk a bit about the bigger picture. My view is that a split is a good idea for both shareholders and the economy. For shareholders, it preserves the part of their business which remains viable (muni insurance). As it is, neither Ambac nor MBIA will be able to write new business of any kind until their AAA/Aaa rating is stable, and that ain't happening without a ton of new capital or a split.

For the economy it would also be beneficial, in my estimation, because it would turn an unknown into a known. See, the market can deal with banks needing more capital, particularly if the new capital required is a known quantity. The market can't deal with capital needs being some wild unknown. Right now write downs and/or new capital needs related to monoline wrapped ABS is a wild unknown. Plus its a wild unknown how the contagion may spread to the municipal market. If the businesses were split, the capital situation for banks would come more into focus. Plus the problems in municipals would be all but eliminated. We'd turn a big unknown into a known, which is always good for markets, even if the known isn't good.

Which brings us to another question: how bad would it be for banks if all the monolines split their municipal and structured finance businesses?

To get to the bottom of this, let's look at Ambac and MBIA's "problem" bonds. These are the bonds trading at large discounts to their original value, and not just because of generalized weaker liquidity: closed-end second liens, home equity, sub-prime first liens, and ABS CDOs. Here is Ambac's exposure to "problem" bonds: (from Ambac's investment relations site)

  • Closed-end second liens: $5.3 billion
  • HELOC: $12 billion
  • Sub-prime first liens: $8.4 billion
  • ABS CDO: $32.2 billion
And MBIA:
  • Closed-end second liens: $11.1 billion
  • HELOC: $11.7 billion
  • Sub-prime first liens: $4.7 billion
  • ABS CDO: $30.6 billion
That's a total of $116.1 billion.

So here are some of the questions that remain to be answered.
  • To what degree have banks already written down the value of these bonds? All indications are that structured finance bonds have been trading like there is no insurance for a while. So if the banks have truly been marking to market, there should be little actual write downs. We'll have to see whether that's actually been the case or not. If I had to bet, I'd bet that the brokerages did a better job than banks in handling write downs.
  • How much of this paper is held by U.S. banks vs. foreign banks? It was widely believed that European banks were big buyers of AAA-rated ABS CDO paper, and that they loved to get wraps on top of that. So it stands to reason that the CDO exposure may be heavily European.
  • How much of a downgrade would the wrapped paper suffer? The banks that hold this paper probably know the answer, since some of the CDS contracts were done privately. That means that the bond's public rating is a uninsured rating. It gets its "insured" treatment by virtue of a separately negotiated CDS contract. Other paper was wrapped when the bond was issued, and may or may not have an underlying rating.

As long as these questions linger, the credit market is going to continue to discount brokerage and bank bonds, which are currently at or near all-time wides. In addition, if banks are uncertain about their capital position, their willingness to lend will be compromised. In other words, we need come to some conclusion with the monolines before the economy can start moving forward.

Wednesday, February 20, 2008

Ambac: Breaking up is hard to do (but still your best choice)

Let's pretend you are the CEO of Ambac. I know, not an enviable job right now. Let's say for the sake of argument, that you really believe in your portfolio. Even though its obvious mortgage defaults will be considerably higher than originally projected, you believe your firm has done great credit work and negotiated the right subordination, and so your losses will be minimal. In other words, let's assume that you actually believe the kinds of things that real-life Ambac CEO Michael Callen has been publicly claiming.

Your problem is that the world at large just thinks your are in denial. That losses in sub prime securities, especially CDO-squareds, are going to suffer severe losses. There is tremendous pressure on Moody's and S&P to downgrade you. As it is, you are completely shut out from writing new municipal insurance business. Once you lose your AAA/Aaa rating, you will more or less be permanently barred from the muni market. There really won't be much hope of reviving your business from there, and you'll be forced into run-off.

This puts you in a difficult position. You believe you have a strong portfolio, but the market doesn't. Unlike other companies, you can't afford to simply tell the market to wait and see. You can't let time prove your point. You have to figure out a way to maintain that rating at all costs, and if something doesn't change right here and now, you will indeed lose that rating.

You are left with only one choice. Separate your good bank from your bad bank. In fact, the Wall Street Journal is reporting Ambac is in talks to do just that. You see, no one is questioning the viability of your muni insurance business. You'll be able to maintain your AAA/Aaa rating on muni insurance if it stands alone. That's your good bank. Then you can work on rebuilding trust with municipal issuers and investors, which will be a challenge. But armed with a AAA/Aaa rating, there is hope. With any other rating, its over.

Of course, that leaves your structured finance business, which is the bad bank. But if Ambac's management really and truly believes that the structured finance stuff was well-underwritten, then they should be comfortable creating a second insurance company which owns only the structured policies. If indeed this portfolio performs reasonably going forward, then the second insurance company will produce strong cash flow. Those structured finance policies require periodic payments to Ambac, so if the "bad bank" performs the way Ambac says it will, then the cash flow return should be attractive.

The challenges of making the split are numerous. There will likely be lawsuits by structured finance holders who logically want to keep the stronger muni business around to support their policies. So we'll see how it plays out. Since government regulators seem keen on providing aide to the muni market pronto, Ambac may get some legal cover if they manage to push this plan forward.

If they don't, then a New York imposed plan seems inevitable. I think its time for Ambac (and MBIA) shareholders to start thinking about how to make the best of a bad situation.

Tuesday, February 19, 2008

Clear your mind of questions

Its time to play ask the internet, because I honestly don't know the answer to this. With FGIC looking to break in two, and Ambac probably thinking the same, there is a question about what happens to their CDS. In other words, if we have a "good bank/bad bank" resolution, what happens to those who have bought protection against the whole bank?

Now I have not personally combed through a CDS contract, but I've got to think there are provisions for what happens in the event of various corporate actions. I mean, its not unheard of for companies to sell-off units so there has to be some established way of dealing with this. My guess it would depend on what the reference item is. My understanding is that under CDS contracts, an "event of default" is defined as the reference item defaulting. So if you have a CDS contract on Ambac, and the reference item is Ambac's 9.375 bonds due 8/1/11, the contract comes into force if that particular bond defaults.

If I'm right about that, it stands to reason that how the CDS would be treated given a split of Ambac depends on what happens to the reference items. I don't happen to know what the common reference item is for MBIA, FGIC or Ambac's well-traded CDS contracts. I also know there is a market for CDS on the insurance sub of these three companies. I have no idea what those reference items might be.

But if anyone out there (CDS Trader, I'm looking at you) knows the answers to any of these questions, please enlighten the group.

Monday, February 18, 2008

J.P. Morgan's ARS Book: A lack of vision

Results of J.P. Morgan's ARS auctions Thursday were fascinating. 50 out of 93 auctions failed, with the "failure" interest rate ranging from 3.41% to 15%. The average among the "failed" bonds was 5.26%. Remember that if an auction fails, there is some mandatory "failure" rate, which varies greatly. My understanding is that a lot of student loan issues have relatively low failure rates, and that's borne out in the J.P. Morgan list. J.P. Morgan shows 12 failed student loan issues, one of which reset at 12%, but the rest reset below 6% despite the failures.

The failures are only half the story, though. Among the "successful" auctions, the average rate was 8.69%, with 14 "successful" issues resetting above 10%. That tells me there are buyers out there who are willing to buy these bonds, and are bidding just below the mandatory failure rate.

There was absolutely no rhyme or reason to what failed vs. succeeded and what rates resulted. The City of New York (rated Aa3/AA) had three issues auctioned, all three of which were fully tax-exempt. The rates were 5%, 5.25%, and 6%. Energy Northwest, a municipal power provider in Washington State, which is rated Aaa/AA-, had their ARS fail, and got a rate of 6.23%. Meanwhile, at one healthcare institution with a Baa3 rating and Radian insurance had their auction succeed with a 4.67% yield.

Several dealers, including UBS and Merrill Lynch are publicly stating they will not necessarily support ARS by buying bonds at auction. As has been discussed, in the past it was common for dealers to step up and buy the ARS to prevent an auction failure. But right now the volumes of failing bonds are just too great, and capital is too constrained. I'm certain the dealers are worried about lawsuits, with investors claiming they were told the bonds could be sold at each auction date without question, which is of course not the case. I don't know how anyone is going to sue when no one has actually lost any money so far, but we'll see.

Meanwhile, I've received many e-mails from people interested in how one can play these ARS failures. One interesting idea is closed-end funds. Most closed-end bond funds are leveraged, usually in the 1.2-1.5x area, and they commonly use auction-rate preferred to create this leverage. Obviously if the ARS reset at 10%, and the fund is buying municipal securities which yield 4%, that's not a good situation. But let's think about closed-end ARS for a second. The closed-end fund has pledged its portfolio of bonds to preferred shareholders. Let's say its a $150 million portfolio of munis, $50 million of which was bought with proceeds from the auction-rate preferred (i.e., 1.5x leverage). But really that means the preferred holders are covered 3 times over: $50 million in debt covered by $150 million in assets. Really that's safer than any single muni issuer.

And yet closed-end muni funds are getting hammered, with several falling more than 5% today. I looked at the worst performers on the day, all of which had leverage created with auction-rate preferreds with 7-day auctions. The highest reset number I found was 3.3%. Excuse me if I don't panic.

Friday, February 15, 2008

When $800 billion you reinsure, look as good you will not!

This just in: Warren Buffett is pretty smart. Wednesday, the Oracle of Omaha offered to reinsure the entire municipal book of FGIC, Ambac, and MBIA, some $800 billion in bonds, in exchange for 150% of the "unearned" premium on those insurance policies. No word on whether he also asked for a pound of flesh or any one's first born.

Anyway, it was pretty obvious from the beginning that none of the monolines would be very keen to such a plan. By accepting, the monolines would be ceding the best part of their business, leaving only the shaky structured finance business remaining. On CNBC yesterday, Buffett tried to explain that the plan would be a net increase in capital for the monolines, so in theory the monolines would be able to keep their gilt-edged rating. Somehow he managed to keep a straight face. While technically the monolines may have more free capital after ceding the munis, the remaining portfolio would be substantially more risky, and I doubt the new capital ratios would please the ratings agencies. For what its worth, Ambac has already told Buffett thanks but no thanks.

But political pressure is growing. Wednesday, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which owns the World Trade Center site as well as operates the PATH train system, had $100 million in Auction Rate Securities fail at auction. This resulted in a 20% coupon for the coming week. In the scheme of things, having to pay an annualized rate of 20% for one week isn't the end of the world, but its an unnecessary expense for the Authority, not to mention embarrassing. I note that the Authority has an A1 ratings from Moody's and a AA- rating from S&P, so it isn't as though there is a credit problem with the Authority. Its that the monoline insurer problem has holders of ARS panicking. The New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority, which operates New York City's subway and bus system has also suffered an auction failure.

These governmental agencies will manage the current problem easily enough. ARS are generally callable on any auction date, so relatively strong credits like the Port Authority will be able to just call the ARS and issue new bonds with some other structure. But the refinancing won't erase the embarrassment of having an auction failure. Governmental agencies, including the Port Authority, will start putting increasing pressure on the New York insurance regulators to resolve this matter once and for all.

So Buffett becomes the bird in hand, something these governmental agencies can point to and ask "why aren't you making that happen?" Perhaps it won't be his specific plan, maybe it will be something along the same lines worked out by the group of bankers that the Insurance Department has been talking to in recent weeks. But the combination of heavy political pressure and a viable private sector solution will be too difficult to ignore. A deal will be worked out to insulate the municipal bond market.